Arcus Market Maker Earns Through Fast, Low-Fee Trading
A high-frequency market maker on Arcus, identified by the public address 0x00cb…aad1, accounted for 27%–29% of trading in two sampled hours and traded across 60 markets. The article estimates its daily turnover at about $116 million, based on its sampled market share and Arcus’s 24-hour volume.
Analysis of 6.3 days of NVDA-USD trades suggests the Arcus market maker earned most of its gross profit by taking liquidity: about $1,446, compared with $268 from maker trades. Its taker trades captured an estimated 0.99 basis points per trade by acting on Binance price moves before Arcus quotes updated. Inventory-related losses were about $71.
Fees were crucial. At Arcus’s standard taker rate, the sampled strategy would have lost money; the address’s observed VIP-level fees and maker rebates brought estimated net profit to about $662. The account held positions across 60 markets, with roughly $45,774 in equity supporting $678,000 in notional exposure. Researchers found no clear evidence of immediate Binance hedging or hedging between NVDA and index positions on Arcus. The analysis is based on public data and cannot rule out hedges elsewhere.
Neutral
The report describes the trading mechanics of one Arcus account rather than a change in market fundamentals, regulation, or network conditions. Its direct market-wide impact is therefore likely limited, supporting a neutral view. The account’s estimated $116 million daily turnover and share of sampled activity may matter for Arcus traders, however: a concentrated, fast market maker can materially affect displayed depth and execution quality, especially if it withdraws or reprices its orders.
In the short term, traders may watch Arcus spreads, order-book depth, and price alignment with Binance. The findings highlight adverse-selection risk for slower liquidity providers and show that low fees can determine whether small price advantages are profitable. Similar lead-lag strategies have appeared in fragmented markets, where faster participants trade against quotes that have not yet adjusted to a reference venue. Such activity can make liquidity more fragile during rapid price moves, but the article does not establish that this account caused broader instability.
Longer term, the analysis may encourage Arcus and its users to monitor venue latency, fee incentives, and liquidity concentration. The strategy’s performance could weaken if Arcus improves quote updates, competing market makers become faster, or fees rise. Conversely, persistent incentives and stale quotes could sustain this type of activity. The evidence is limited to public Arcus data and one account; it does not establish overall exchange health or reveal any off-platform hedging, so it should not be read as a directional signal for crypto prices.