Chinese‑language Telegram laundering networks moved $82B on‑chain in 2025, Chainalysis warns
Chainalysis reports on‑chain crypto money laundering exceeded $82 billion in 2025, driven by organised Chinese‑language money‑laundering networks (CMLNs) that operate largely via Telegram. CMLNs moved about $16.1 billion in 2025 (~$44 million per day) across roughly 1,799 active wallets and are estimated to have handled ~20% of illicit crypto funds over the past five years. These networks now laundered over 10% of funds stolen in “pig butchering” scams and their inflows grew thousands of times faster than flows to centralized exchanges, DeFi or other illicit on‑chain transfers. Operators use Telegram channels, money‑mule motorcades, running‑point brokers and vendor marketplaces to offer fast, hard‑to‑trace services, sometimes clearing large transfers in under two minutes. Stablecoins dominate illicit volume—USDT alone leads—accounting for roughly 84% of the total, reflecting stablecoins’ cross‑border convenience and low volatility. Chainalysis links the networks’ growth partly to China’s capital controls and persistent demand for cross‑border value movement. The firm urges a shift from reactive platform enforcement to proactive disruption of operators, vendors and advertising channels, and calls for enhanced public–private cooperation, law‑enforcement capacity building and better information‑sharing to dismantle these professional laundering services. Traders should note increased regulatory scrutiny, potential on‑chain tracing improvements and possible exchange compliance changes that could affect stablecoin flows and liquidity.
Bearish
This news is bearish for related crypto markets, primarily stablecoins and venues that rely on illicit stablecoin flows. Key reasons: 1) Increased enforcement pressure — Chainalysis’ public report and recommendations typically spur regulators and exchanges to tighten KYC/AML controls, freeze suspect flows and cooperate internationally, which can reduce illicit liquidity and usable stablecoin supply in certain corridors. 2) Stablecoin flow disruption — About 84% of illicit volume is in stablecoins (USDT dominant); disruptions or delistings would reduce short‑term liquidity, widen spreads, and raise transaction costs for traders who use stablecoins as a fiat proxy. 3) Market microstructure impact — Rapid shutdowns of laundering rails or enhanced on‑chain tracing could trigger sudden balance reallocation, causing short‑term volatility in stablecoin pairs and affected trading pairs on CEXs and DEXs. 4) Counterparty risk repricing — Exchanges and OTC desks may increase compliance checks and withdraw services in high‑risk corridors, reducing arbitrage efficiency and increasing funding costs. In the long term the effect may be neutral to mildly positive for market integrity as tougher enforcement lowers illicit activity and improves on‑chain transparency, but the immediate effect is likely reduced liquidity and higher volatility for stablecoin‑paired markets.