Cosmos EVM Security Crisis Triggers Chain Halts After KiiChain & TAC Attacks
Cosmos Labs has urged Cosmos EVM operators to halt operations after a security incident linked to the shared Cosmos EVM infrastructure. The issue is not chain-specific code, raising systemic risk for multiple Cosmos EVM networks.
Key updates: (1) KiiChain said an attacker drained 148,326,583.15 KII by repeating the same technique 18 times on Aug. 22. The chain halted at block 9,355,723 after internal detection, freezing remaining funds. KiiChain traced the root cause to a Cosmos EVM staking precompile underflow plus two additional undisclosed bugs, and warned vesting-account configurations could be impacted. (2) TAC reported a separate exploit of the Cosmos EVM precompile-layer flaw on the same day, draining 2,985,651,403 TAC from one account. TAC halted its network to stop further loss. (3) MANTRA paused Layer 1 for about 30 hours as a precaution, later saying the threat was contained and user balances were unchanged.
Cosmos Labs said it requested coordinated validator stops across Cosmos EVM teams and will publish an incident report after resolution. KiiChain criticized patch handling, noting a fix posted Aug. 19 was not clearly flagged as critical and no halt recommendation was bundled when it reached affected networks.
For traders, the Cosmos EVM security crisis can increase near-term volatility and liquidity risk around KII and TAC, especially if additional halts or delayed incident details emerge.
Bearish
This update signals a Cosmos EVM infrastructure flaw that already caused confirmed token losses (KII and TAC) and triggered multiple chain halts. For KII and TAC, traders typically expect renewed risk over the next sessions due to potential follow-on exploitation, uncertainty about remaining exposure, and the chance that coordinated validator stops could affect liquidity and trading depth. In the longer term, market sentiment may stabilize only after Cosmos Labs publishes a complete incident report and teams confirm the full scope of affected configurations (e.g., vesting accounts) and remediation timing.